Hindenburg's Hour - The Tannenberg Campaign 1914

The Battle of Tannenberg

The German strategy at the beginning of the First World War was based on the so-called Schlieffen Plan, named after the Prussian general field marshal Alfred Graf von Schlieffen. This saw a quick downpour of the opponents in the West, while the east should be largely defensive. The main power of the army was therefore to be deployed in the West, while in the East there were only small forces. As soon as the enemy was defeated in the West, forces would be transferred to the East to fight against the Russian army. It was assumed that the Russian army would take a long time to mobilize its army and to march on the borders of East Prussia. To the surprise of the German Supreme Army Command, the Russian army's advance was much faster,

As early as the beginning of August, two Russian armies marched towards East Prussia. On August 17, the Russian large-scale offensive began on East Prussia. Already three days later came the first great encounter of the opposing armies in Gumbinnen. It was true that the German units were able to stop the Russian army temporarily, but only with considerable losses. As the Russian army continued the advance in a short time, the German commander Max von Prittwitz ordered a retreat behind the Weisel line. Prittwitz feared that he would not be able to withstand a new weapon. The German Supreme Military Command responded horrified to the retreat, and Prittwitz released his task on August 21st. Now the Paul of Hindenburg, who had been appointed from retirement, was re-activated as commander-in-chief. Erich Ludendorff acted as a staff chief at his side.

At the same time, the Russian army showed serious shortcomings. The Russian army was weakened and torn apart by the rapid march and wide roads. The supply could not follow this pace either. The Russian army also refrained from effective air reconnaissance and did not encrypt its radio traffic. This gave the German side an insight into the plans of the Russian army, while the Russian leadership was largely blind. The two Russian generals Alexander Samsonov and Paul von Rennenkampff also had a deeply felt antipathy, which made coordinated action impossible. Nevertheless, Tsar Nicholas II urged another rapid action. With this advance in knowledge Erich Ludendorff and Max Hoffmann create a plan,

The German units positioned themselves in Westmasuren and on 25 August 1914 two German divisions under General Hermann von Francois pushed between the Russian main power and their left flank. One day later, the German associations began to enclose. It took two days for the Russian army to react to this threat, which made the encasement easier.

In the ensuing battles, the German army concentrated its forces in the decisive battles and retained the upper hand in the disputes. At this point it must be mentioned that the Russian artillery was not able to intervene effectively in the battles and thus the tactics of the Russian units were hopelessly hopeless. On 28 August, the German forceps at Willenberg and the entire Narew army under Samsonov was cut off.

The killing began on August 29, and the Russian units were quickly demoralized and fighting tired. The news that there was no longer a retreat, shook the Russian federations. Samsonov could not unite his troops to a concentrated outbreak attempt, and the Russian federations were therefore hopeless. On the 30th of August the capitulation followed and Samsonov committed suicide.

The initial situation of the German army now changed fundamentally. The Russian advance in East Prussia was suddenly stopped and a threatening defeat averted. Paul von Rennenkampff, after defeat, had further offensive operations. The battle was later named Hindenburg's "Battle of Tannenberg", since Tannenberg was still associated with a defeat of the German Order in 1410.

One can also note that some military historians believe that a "Schlieffen plan" with a reverse sign - that is, a defensive in the West and an offensive in the East - would have been the better German strategy in August 1914. Other historians say that a German defeat in East Prussia would have shortened the First World War to the summer of 1914.